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February 23, 2006

Polygamy: An Evolutionary Guide to the Hazards of Multiple Marriage

Tim Harford writes in a recent Slate column about the economic case for polygamy (multiple spouses). His argument is excellent, but focuses primarily on the consequences for male and female prenuptial bargaining positions. I wish to take that analysis further, moving from an economic to an evolutionary perspective. From there a much darker picture emerges, one that reveals hidden dangers posed by a surplus of unmarried males. However such surpluses arise—through polygamy or some other mechanism—those hazards belong uppermost in our thinking. This analysis further provides an ultimate explanation for the moral prohibitions against multiple marriage that have arisen in many cultures, as well as a logical basis for the intuitive aversion to polygamy that most of us, both male and female, feel.

Harford’s essay is triggered by news of a Chechen leader’s suggestion that, because war has reduced the number of marriageable men in Chechnya, rather than leave large numbers of women out in the reproductive cold, men who can support more than one wife should do so. Polygyny (individual husbands having multiple wives) makes sense, of course, in cases like Chechnya where men are scarce. To see why, you need only imagine the future effects of continuing to enforce monogamous rules—large numbers of women in the current generation would fail to reproduce, the population would decline and that would further weaken the country that those missing men died to protect.

Or to put it another way, it would make no sense for marriage rules to needlessly empower a nation’s enemies by converting the death of a single soldier into a loss that perpetuates through future generations. Instead successful monogamous societies should be expected to have mechanisms for bending the rules such that birthrates can be maintained in spite of a deficit of young men.

So the real question is, are spouseless Chechen women to be forced into single motherhood, or should they instead be allowed to share other women’s husbands. From virtually every perspective polygyny is the better choice. It is certainly better for the vast majority of those kids that would otherwise have lacked fathers. And in terms of efficiency, it is clearly better for Chechnya to broadly distribute the extra burden created by those children, rather than have it fall solely on the shoulders of spouseless mothers. The only perspective—besides Russia's—from which it is arguably worse, is that of the women who would otherwise have become married monogamously. Those women would clearly be giving up a chunk of the value found in an exclusive husband.

But even from the perspective of these women it is, in the long run, probably for the best. After all, future generations will be in big trouble if Chechnya grows continually weaker due to a low birth rate, triggering a vicious cycle in which the country’s fading military prowess invites further military conflict, robbing the marriage market of ever more young men—ultimately that pattern would likely condemn most Chechen family lines to oblivion. So would-be monogamous brides are likely to accept their sacrifice as necessary and right. And those that don’t may well find themselves viewed as gluttonous. Indeed, sharing of husbands may be the historical female analog to the patriotic sacrifice that men have traditionally made on the battlefield.

Of course, one has to be very careful with any analysis that says that it makes sense for an individual to sacrifice for the good of the group. Most arguments of that form are doomed because evolution prioritizes individual interests over group interests—so, for example, from the vantage point of an already married woman, the best reproductive strategy involves other women saving Chechnya by sharing their husbands. But the present argument does not require an appeal to altruism or ‘group selection.’ Patriotism evolved for a reason, and many Chechen women will likely forgo their short term ‘best case’ in favor of a viable future for their descendents. The Chechen situation is, in fact, tailor made to trigger such types of self-sacrifice.

And sharing isn’t all bad either. There are real benefits for women who share husbands, deriving from the natural tendency to pool child rearing duties and other obligations. In fact, for many women—even ones forced to share husbands that would otherwise have been theirs alone, the net effect can be positive in the short term as well. In cases where the math is close, evolutionary costs can be reduced yet further by sharing a husband with a sister or another close relative.

Because there are real benefits to pooling resources and duties, rational women may even choose to share a husband in circumstances where there is no shortage of men. A terribly skewed distribution of wealth, for example can easily tip the scales for women, sharing a Chieftain being a better evolutionary strategy, in most cases, than marrying a popper.

Women in modern industrialized societies may feel some satisfaction and relief at having escaped such choices. But that sense is false comfort. Were alien anthropologists to study modern ‘western’ societies, they might rightly conclude that many women have strangely signed up for the costs of polygyny without demanding the benefits. Rich men routinely find ways to father the children of multiple wives, and because they tend to do it sequentially rather than under one roof, the women and children do not get the benefit of pooling their assets and effort. Or more accurately, such women have, in many cases, traded those benefits for fungible economic assets that can be used to buy cooperation from strangers in the marketplace. Is that a good deal? I don’t know that anyone has properly studied the question.

In any case, from a ‘fitness’ perspective, polygyny is, obviously, a good deal for men in a position to marry multiply. And, despite our intuition, choosing to share a husband can sometimes be a rational choice for a woman as well. So why have most modern societies come to forbid it? And why should we as individuals, deplore it? As it turns out, our gut instinct that polygyny generally benefits men is even more seriously in error than our instinct about the consequences for women. In fact, it is nearly the inverse of the truth: if there is no shortage of men in a breeding pool, then polygyny is a bad deal for all men who are not rich, a terrible deal for men who are poor, and a hazard to society at large. It has also, in modern times, come to pose a serious danger to the stability of the world.

To see where the costs come from, let’s consider an admittedly simplified hypothetical polygynous society in which all of a person’s assets and liabilities get summed to produce a desirability index. At the top of the male hierarchy, the most desirable man—no doubt wealthy and powerful—will likely get some combination of the most wives and the most desired wives. The next most desirable man will do a little worse because several of the most sought after mates have already been taken—in a monogamous society, that second man would likely have married the penultimate woman, but in the present case, he starts significantly lower on the list. And the same logic applies to all the men below the first one—when polygyny is common, the pool of brides is rapidly depleted from the top down, and everybody but the top groom marries much lower than he would otherwise have done. This decrease in mate desirability is, at an evolutionary level, likely a price worth paying for men near the top, as these slight decreases in bride desirability are more than made up for in bride quantity.

But when you get down to the guys who can afford only one wife, it is easy to see that the desirability of available mates will be dramatically reduced from the monogamous circumstance, while the number of wives they will marry is exactly what it would have been. That isn’t a good deal at all. And if we continue down the hierarchy, there will come a point at which there just aren’t any more women of marriageable age—for every woman sharing another woman’s husband at the top of society, there will be a man at the bottom with no mate and poor prospects.

Such men are very likely to be frustrated and resentful. They also have little to lose because, unless they do something to shake things up, they are likely to be reproductive dead ends. So they may be eager for a big score and willing to risk life, limb and liberty to get it. That’s a recipe for disaster. In the short term it is sure to increase crime rates. For obvious reasons, that includes rape and murder. In turn, this crime will require increasing investments in police and prisons and all of the attendant harms.

And there is another probable outcome. The rich and powerful are always reluctant to part with privilege, so instead of fixing the problem at its source, they may instead elect to kill two birds with one stone and harness all that dangerous anger by arming these lower class men and sending them on nationalistic adventures.

So, from the perspective of fostering international peace and stability, addressing polygyny should be a priority. But one must be very careful. Polygyny, itself—as the Chechen example demonstrates—is not a problem. It is the creation, by whatever means, of large quantities of surplus males that make nations dangerous, and that can even happen in monogamous societies. China, for example, is building up a surplus of men as a consequence of the ‘one child’ policy in combination with a strong traditional preference for sons.

At one level, this accumulation of Chinese males is difficult to account for. The evolutionary logic underlying the usual evenness of sex ratios involves the recognition that, as one sex becomes more common, the evolutionary rewards for producing babies of the rare sex grow, maintaining a rough balance over time. Indeed, it seems so very logical that, given the glut, Chinese families should now prefer daughters, who will be sure to marry, over sons, who may well not. And yet the expected shift in preference doesn’t emerge.

Whether this is all an accident produced by the collision of ancient Chinese desires with modern Chinese rules and medical technology, or the result of a conscious manipulation of circumstances with military objectives, one thing is increasingly clear. Given the immense size of China’s population, any significant male bias in the sex ratio of a Chinese generation is likely to become the world’s problem, because even a slight surplus of men represents a large number of men in absolute terms—an army waiting to happen. It is as if we are watching troops slowly massing along a border, except that the border exists in time rather than space. Serious concern is warranted, and yes it is the world’s business.

Of course one is tempted to look for a Chechen style solution—perhaps Chinese men could share wives, for example. But unfortunately, that idea is a non-starter. Polyandry (individual females having exclusive access to multiple mates) is an extremely rare phenomenon both among human societies and in other species. That’s because it only makes evolutionary sense in the rarest of circumstances, where conditions are so difficult that two parents are generally not sufficient to raise children successfully. In more common circumstances, the costs of polyandry to men are high and the benefits are close to nil across the board. That’s because females are the limiting reproductive resource, a woman’s maximum birthrate being not much affected by how many husbands she has. The contrast is stark—given ample wealth, a man with twenty wives has twenty times the reproductive potential of another man with one wife. But a woman with twenty husbands is, in terms of reproductive rate, not much ahead of a woman with one husband. And on top of the dubious benefits, the evolutionary costs to males that share wives are potentially huge in terms of paternal effort spent on other men’s offspring—something men have evolved to fear and avoid.

The net effect of all this evolutionary asymmetry is that women aren’t likely to be especially keen on the idea of polyandry, and men would probably rather go to war. Who knows? At war, at least you might meet somebody. Especially if the other side has experienced a sudden shortage of men.

February 12, 2006

The New Republicans: 50% of the voters, 95% of the power.

Conventional wisdom has it that Democrats are out of touch and unfit for electoral combat. But in a recent Slate column (Kick Me, I’m a Democrat), Michael Kinsley challenges that growing perspective, pointing out that Democrats are not being shut out in massively one-sided elections, they are being edged out, and just barely at that. Even in deepest red-state America, he reminds us, blue voters are only a little less common than red voters. And beyond that, if you poll people about the national agenda, on an issue by issue basis, the country solidly backs most Democratic objectives, and rejects the Republican alternatives. So, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Democrats are very much in the hunt—given a slightly better strategy or a small shift in the landscape, the tables might easily be turned.

It’s a hard position to argue with. Much of it is beyond question. This graphical analysis, for example, bears out the demographic point with mind-blowing clarity. And Kinsley is, of course, right about the broad scale support for Democratic issues as well. In fact, he undersells it a little.

Strong support for ‘progressive’ programs has been there all along. It didn’t waver in 1980, the moment when Reagan’s election first promoted that progressive streak to the status of paradox. And the apparent contradiction has remained with us through all the rightward lurching the country has done in the decades since. In that context, it is hard to know what to make of those longstanding and deep-seated beliefs. But any trend that completely overlaps the period of Republican ascendancy can hardly be taken as a positive political sign, no matter how logical the connection appears.

Sadly, for reasons that Democratic Party leaders seem perennially incapable of explaining, issues no longer seem to matter. And the paradoxes don’t end there. Empirically speaking, thin Republican margins have been more than enough to invert the nation’s course, and to defend that reversal against a quarter century of Democratic attempts to right the ship of state.

It is that very tendency of Republicans to uncouple the normal rules of logic that justifies the gravest concern and casts the deepest doubt on Kinsley’s hopeful premise. In fact, the sheer magnitude of the power imbalance between the parties is sufficient reason for Democratic panic. The Republicans have tapped into some higher order truths that transcend the axioms of Democratic stoicism. Indeed, the fact that so many contests are won by Republicans on razor thin margins says a great deal more about thriftiness and sophistication on the part of the radical right than it does about the potential for meaningful Democratic victories in the near term.

Don’t get me wrong. I’m not saying that Democrats won’t win more elections. They will. What I am saying is that victories won in the foreseeable future will be like Bill Clinton’s victories—they will succeed only in slowing the pace of the rightward slide, not in reversing it. In order to reverse course, the Democrats would need to make widespread gains and to sustain a sizable majority for a good long time. After all, it took the Republicans decades to do all this damage, and doing damage is quick work compared to building. Unfortunately, broad, sustained victories just ain’t in the cards for the left.

Here’s why:

In the modern incarnation of our democracy, votes can, in a sense, be purchased. Not directly, of course, but for a price, facts can be spun, opponents can be smeared, journalists can be cultivated, voter attitudes can be probed, and ads can be televised. Perhaps most importantly, swing constituencies can be promised a small measure of the power that flows from victory. It’s staggeringly expensive at one level, but swaying voters in this way is also a bargain given the vast sums at stake in governmental activity (or inactivity, as is more often the case).

But like all such pursuits, the search for capturable votes—or more accurately, the quest for favorable changes in the net totals—is subject to the law of diminishing returns. Weather operatives are cultivating apathy in opposition voters, winning ‘hearts and minds’ or motivating the faithful to turnout, the greater the margin of victory, the more it costs per voter. So naturally, the Republicans are reluctant to squander more treasure and political capital on a given race than that race demands. Sure, all else being equal, they would prefer that any given contest be won by a landslide. But all else is never equal. Mandates are expensive and most provide only a small measures of extra power. In any case, large margins do not provide a good return on investment compared to spending the surplus funds on some other race where a loss can be converted to a win. And so it goes, a more or less ‘global’ calculation : optimizing the real power returned on the dollars invested.

How well are the Republicans doing at this game? Analyses focused on electoral margins suggest that Republicans are doing better than the Democrats, though only slightly. But all such analyses are suspect because they are unable to explain the utter dominance of the Republican agenda throughout the last quarter century. The fact that the pendulum swung right in 1980 and just kept going suggests that the two parties are no longer in the same league. And indeed, the apparent imbalance must be real, for if the parties were truly in a dead heat, then luck, in the form of statistical noise and unpredictable events, would tend to throw equal numbers of close races and surprise victories to Democrats and Republicans.

But that’s not the way it works. An evenly divided nation has produced a very unevenly divided government because, when races are close they tend to go one way and not the other—barely, perhaps, but they go. Republicans have seemingly cornered the market on luck, which is to say, it isn’t luck at all. As events in a campaign favor Democrats, money is infused and tides turned. That process doesn’t even stop when the polls close anymore. In a sufficiently close race, the recount represents a fresh set of opportunities for money to be heard.

If the imbalance were an anomaly, that would be one thing. But it isn’t. The G.O.P. has had sufficient power to set the national agenda for 25+ years, and they have never had more power than they do today. This analysis at least provides a means to reconcile the fact that Republicans constitute only half of the voting electorate, with the observation that elected Republicans wield the vast majority of the power in the system. Margins cost, power pays. Consequently, the imbalance of power tells the real story, and margins say very little.

Obviously, this analysis does not bode well for the future. The profits reaped as a product of all that Republican power are staggering. It’s hard to know where to stop counting, but hundreds of billions of dollars are clearly won in this game over the course of an average election cycle. And surely, should the country show signs of changing course—something that has not occurred since Reagan’s first election—those core Republicans could easily afford to double or triple (or whatever) their investment in winning elections. And why wouldn’t they? When political power is a commodity, expect it to behave like one.